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More  than  a  million  foreigners  reportedly
reside  in  South  Korea  now,  with  unskilled
migran t  worke r s  a c coun t ing  f o r  a
majority.  Although the country’s  reliance on
imported  foreign  labor  is  likely  to  continue
unabated,  the  country  prides  itself  as  an
ethnically homogenous society and insists on
almost zero-immigration policy. However, this
paper  shows  that  Korean  society  is  rapidly
becoming  a  multicultural  society  and  this
process  is  inevitable  and  irreversible.  In
support of this argument, the paper examines
various social factors that are contributing to
the making of a multiethnic Korea, including
the  continuing  influx  of  migrant  workers,
rapid aging of the population, low fertility rate,
and shortage of brides. The paper also assesses
the applicability of various theories and trends
of migration to the Korean context. The Korean
case suggests a need for a paradigm shift in
understanding  multiculturalism.  This  is
because  the  dominant  perspectives  and
theories  on  multiculturalism  have  been
western-centric,  based on western experience
and focusing on racial differences and tensions.
 Multiculturalism in  Korea  as  well  as  in  its
neighboring countries like China,  Japan,  and
Taiwan  is  fundamentally  different,  as  it
involves  people  of  s imi lar  physical
appearances and historical cultural bonds, and
it entails ethnic rather than racial differences.
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Introduction
A report by the U.N. (2006) shows that the
number  of  people  who  live  and  work
outside their countries of birth has doubled
over the last 35 years to 191 million in 2005
(see  International  Organization  for
Migration  2005).   The  total  represents
about  three  per  cent  of  the  world’s
population  or  one  in  every  35  persons.
 About 6 out of 10 international migrants
live in high-income economies,  including
22 prosperous developing countries  such
as  South  Korea,  Singapore,  Taiwan,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar
(United  Nations  2006,  p.  12).   Other
findings  by  the  report  include  the
fo l lowing:  around  75  per  cent  o f
international  migrants  lived  in  just  28
countries,  with  one  in  five  living  in  the
United  States;  international  migrants
comprise  at  least  20  per  cent  of  the
population  in  41  countries;  women
comprise  nearly  half  of  all  international
migrants  and  they  outnumber  male
migrants in developed countries;  about a
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third  of  the  191  million  international
migrants has moved from one developing
country to another, while another third has
migrated from a developing country to a
developed  country,  indicating  that  the
number  of  “South-to-South”  migrants
approximates  that  of  “South-to-North”
migrants  (United  Nations  2006,  p.  12).  
A s  i n  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  wo r ld ,
international  migration  in  Asia  is  an
important  social  issue.  Most  countries  in
the region are affected by temporary labor
migration  as  either  labor-exporting  or
labor-importing countries. Only a handful
of Asian countries or territories, the richest
ones, have a net import of labor. These are
Japan,  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  Singapore,
Hong Kong, and Malaysia. Since the 1980s
Japan has been importing foreign workers
to meet the demand for cheap labor from
small- to mid-sized firms. The country now
has about two million registered foreigners
(1.57 per cent of the population), including
600,000  Korean  descendents  of  colonial
immigrants , [1 ]  and  the  i ssues  of
citizenship,  nationhood,  and  national
identity  have  become  important  and
controversial  political  issues  (see
Yamanaka 2000, 2004a and 2004b; Lie 2000,
2001; Arudou and Higuchi 2008).  
GDP of Asian countries (PPP) in global
perspective
South Korea (henceforth Korea) has been
importing significant numbers of migrant
workers since the early 1990s.  As of the
end of 2007,  registered foreigners totaled
1,066,273, accounting for 2.2 per cent of the
total population. The number of foreigners
in Korea jumped 2.75 times since 1997 from
386,972. If the current trend continues, the
number of foreigners in Korea would reach
1.5 million in 2012, 2.5 million in 2020, and
4.1 million by 2050 or 9.2 per cent of the
total population, which would be similar to
the proportion of foreign-born residents in
England (9.7 per cent) in 2005. 
A  large  majority  of  foreigners  in  Korea
have entered the country with work visas
and the number of foreigners with work
visas, as of May 2008, amounted to more
than 700,000. The 2008 total represents an
annual  increase  of  nearly  100,000  new
arrivals  since  late  2004,  when the  figure
was  460,000.  Most  of  those  who entered
Korea  with  work  visas,  including  more
than 200,000 overstaying migrant workers,
have been unskilled migrant workers. 
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The demand for foreign labor has largely
come  about  as  better-educated  and
wealthier  Koreans  began  to  turn  away
from  certain  occupation  categories,
especially the so-called 3-D (difficult, dirty,
and  dangerous)  manual  jobs,  prompting
the Korean government to utilize several
labor-importing schemes since 1992 to both
secure  and  control  foreign  workers.  The
number of foreigners in Korea will increase
further  as  the  anticipated  bride  shortage
brings in more foreigners. 
The  presence  of  growing  numbers  of
unskilled  migrant  workers,  along with  a
substantial  number of foreign brides and
professional  foreign  workers,  marks  a
significant  departure from the proverbial
image  o f  Korea  a s  an  e thn i ca l ly
homogenous society. Although foreigners
constituted only a little over one per cent of
the total population of 48 million as of the
end of 2005, the country is on its way to
becoming  a  multiracial  and  multiethnic
society.  This  paper  examines  the  factors
that will generate substantial inflow labor
migrants and brides, notably rapid aging
of the population and the resulting labor
shortage,  and  son  preferential  practices
and shortage of brides.  It also assesses the
applicability of existing migration theories
to  the  Korean  context  and  analyzes
international migration in Korea in light of
general trends in global migration. 
Unskilled  Migration  Workers:  History  of
Labor Importation Policies in Korea
Korea was a labor-exporting country from
the  early  1960s  to  the  late  1980s.[2]   
Thousands of  Korean workers  emigrated
annually in the 1960s and 1970s, notably to
Germany, when miners and nurses made
up  the  bulk  of  the  outgoing  migrant
workers. During the “construction boom”
of  the  1970s  and  early  1980s,  tens  of
thousands  of  Koreans  were  sent  to  the
Middle  East  to  work  as  construction
workers  for  Korean  companies.  In  the
1980s, more than 30,000 Koreans migrated
annually as laborers to other countries. By
1993,  the  figure  had  dwindled  to  18,000
(Ministry of Justice 1982-1993). 
Since the late 1980s, Korea changed from a
labor-exporting nation to a labor-importing
nation (Park 1994). When foreign migrant
workers began arriving in Korea in 1987,
the  shortage  of  manual  workers  was
estimated at 100,000, mainly in small- and
medium-sized manufacturing firms (Kwon
2004, p. 1). Since the mid-1980s, Korea has
experienced a deceleration in the growth of
the domestic labor force as the rural labor
su rp lus  was  exhaus t ed  and  the
participation  rate  of  youth  (15-19  age
group)  in  the  labor  force  declined
significantly due to longer schooling. The
labor  shortage  was  also  caused  by  the
booming  construction  industry,  which
drew Korean workers out of relatively low-
paying  factory  jobs  into  higher-paying
construction  work.  Moreover,  growing
labor market segmentation since the early
1990s  brought  about  uneven  labor
shortages: large firms subcontracted some
of their labor-intensive production lines to
small firms (5-29 employees) to cope with
growing  national  and  international
competition, leading to an increase in the
percentage  of  employees  in  small  firms
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from 18.3 per cent in 1980 to 27.6 per cent
in 1995. The labor shortages in Korea were
and are thus “more serious in smaller firms
than in larger firms, and in unskilled jobs
than in highly skilled jobs” (Lee, H. 1997,
p .  3 5 7 ) .  T h e  l a b o r  s h o r t a g e  i n
manufacturing became very serious in 1991
when  unfilled  production  jobs  totaled
222,000.
Migrant workers in Korea organize
Perhaps  more  important  than  the
migration  transition  and  labor  market
segmentation  in  explaining  labor
importation  in  Korea  is  a  demand  for
cheap, unskilled labor to fill jobs shunned
by Koreans. In congruence with dual labor
market  theory,  the  demand  for  foreign
labor  in  Korea  came  about  as  relatively
better-educated,  more  status-conscious,
and wealthier Koreans began to turn away
from  low-paying  and  less  prestigious
manual jobs. To mitigate the labor shortage
in unskilled,  manual  jobs,  since 1992 the
Korean government has sought to bring in
and control the inflow of unskilled migrant
workers. [3] The number of such workers
entering  Korea  increased  from 33,861  in
1994 to 49,345 in 2000, and 106,688 in 2004.
Korea attracted workers from a dozen or so
Asian  countries,  including  China
(predominantly ethnic Koreans), Vietnam,
Indones ia ,  Bang ladesh ,  and  the
Philippines.  Recently,  however,  unskilled
migrant workers have come from dozens
of  countries  from throughout  the  world,
including  Russia,  Pakistan,  India,
Uzbekistan, Brazil, and Nigeria. They are
employed  in  agriculture,  fishery  and
service industries as well as in 3D jobs in
industries  including  construction,  metal
work, dyeing, auto-parts, tanning, textiles,
furniture-manufacturing and other  small-
to medium-scale manufacturing industries
(see Seol 1999, 2000; Seol et al. 1999; Kim,
W. 2004). 
Four  types  of  work permits  regulate  the
influx  of  foreign  workers:  Professional
Work  Permit  System  (PWPS),  Industrial
Training  System  (ITS),  Employment
Management System (EMS) for less-skilled
overseas Koreans, and Employment Permit
System  (EPS)  for  unskilled  foreign
workers.  The  work  permit  system
stipulates  different  conditions  and
entitlements for skilled and less-skilled or
unskilled workers.  Skilled foreign workers
are  subject  to  less  regulation  than  their
less-skilled counterparts. The Immigration
Bureau does not limit the number of visas
for  skilled  workers,  while  setting  visa
quotas for less-skilled foreign workers in
specified  industrial  sectors  where  their
labor  is  needed.
The Industrial Training System (ITS) was
implemented  in  January  1994.  In  the
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inaugural  year,  31,830  Asian  workers
arrived.  Since  then,  the  number  of
industrial  trainees  fluctuated  between
25,000  and 52,000.  The  training  program
consists  of  a  one-year  training  and two-
year  work  permit  system:  trainees  are
eligible to apply for a work permit  after
completion of the training program. If they
are successful in obtaining a work permit,
they can work as regular workers with the
full  range  of  labor  rights.   Four  main
sectors  in  which these  trainees  work are
manufacturing,  construction,  agricultural,
and inland and coastal fisheries. However,
the  trainee  program  created  many
problems:  t ra inees  of ten  became
undocumented workers as they ran away
from the  trainee  program for  better  pay
elsewhere (trainees were paid barely more
than the minimum wage and were often
forced to work overtime with no overtime
pay); there were many reports of abuses as
trainees were not protected by the Labor
Standard  Law.   The  Industrial  Training
System  was  discontinued  in  January  1,
2007.
The Employment Permit System (EPS) for
less-skilled  or  unskilled  foreign  workers
was implemented on August  17,  2004 to
ultimately  replace  the  problematic
ITS. Unlike the ITS, which was controlled
and operated by business associations, all
activities  of  the  EPS—registration  of
potential  migrant workers,  selection,  pre-
departure  orientation,  post-arrival
orientation,  job  placement,  return  and
reintegration, and monitoring—are strictly
regulated  by  government  agencies.  The
new system is  aimed at  providing equal
treatment  to  foreign  workers,  including
basic labor rights,  employment insurance
and legal minimum wages, while ensuring
a stable supply of manpower for Korean
employers. However, foreign workers are
banned from changing workplaces on their
own and are allowed to work in Korea for
a  maximum of  three  years.  To  establish
labor  migration  through  bilateral
agreements  between  the  sending  and
receiving  countries,  the  government
entered a memorandum of understanding
(MOU )  w i t h  s i x  A s i a n
countries—Thailand, Viet Nam, Mongolia,
S r i  L ank a ,  I ndon e s i a ,  a nd  t h e
Philippines—from  which  about  25,000
workers  arrived  in  2004.  In  2006,  three
other  countries  were  added—Uzbekistan,
Pakistan,  and  Cambodia—followed  by
MOU  with  China,  Bangladesh,  Kyrgyz
Republic, Nepal, Myanmar and East Timor
in 2007. More than 100,000 workers arrived
from these  countries  in  2007  alone.  The
Korean Ministry of Labor assigns annual
quotas to all  sending countries according
to  employer  preference,  evaluation  of
sending  procedures,  and  the  number  of
illegal  workers.   Consequently,  sending
countries  compete  for  quotas,  which  is
expected to bring higher quality workers to
Korea and guarantee fairness in recruiting
in  the  sending  countries.  Eligibility  is
restricted  to  manufacturing  companies
with less than 300 workers who can prove
that  they  previously  tried  to  employ
Korean  workers.
In addition, an Employment Management
System  (EMS)  for  overseas  Koreans  has
been implemented since December 2002 for
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overseas  Koreans  who  have  foreign
nationalities. To be eligible, they have to be
at least  30 years old and have a relative
living in Korea (there are plans to bring
down  the  age  restriction  to  25).  The
occupation  categories  for  EMS  are
accommodation  and  restaurant,  cleaning
service, assistance with household affairs,
and the  like.   EMS permit  holders  were
originally  allowed to  stay for  up to  two
years,  but  from August  2004  permission
was extended to three years.
Through these labor importation schemes,
several hundred thousand foreign workers,
skilled and unskilled,  have been brought
into  Korea,  ushering  in  the  dawn  of  a
multiethnic Korea.
Korea’s  Aging  Population  and  Labor
Shortage
Korea is one of the world’s most rapidly
aging societies and its fertility rate is falling
at a record pace to a level well below the
replacement rate of 2.1 children per family.
 In 2000, Korea became an “aging society,”
in  which  7  per  cent  of  the  population
consists of  the elderly (those 65 years or
older).  If  current  population  trends
continue, the country will transition to an
“aged society” in 2019, when 14 percent of
the population will be elderly. Korea will
become  a  “superaged  society”  by  2026,
when the elderly would make up 20 per
cent of the population. 
Korea’s aging population
While economically advanced nations took
decades to transit from an aging society to
an aged society, Korea will do so within a
generation  (roughly  19  years).   It  took
France 115 years (1864-1979) to make the
transition,  Sweden  85  years  (1887-1972),
and  England  45  years  (1930-1975)  (see
Table 1).  Korea’s 19-year mark will break
the world record of 26 years set by Japan
(1970-1996).  Korea is expected to take just
7 years to pass from an aged society to a
super-aged  society,  again  beating  the
Japanese record of 12 years.  The United
Nations  pro jects  Korea’s  e lderly
population to rise to 24.1 per cent of the
total in 2030 and 37.3 per cent in 2050, the
highest in the world (Korea Times 2005a).
 The  U.N.  forecasts  that  Japan’s  aged
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population will rise to the second highest
level with 36.5 per cent in 2050, followed
by Spain (35 per cent), Italy (34.4 per cent)
and  the  Netherlands  (33.2  per  cent).
Demographers  have  coined  the  term
“agequake” to refer to the dire economic
and social impact of Korean aging.
(/data/Table1.jpg)
Rapid  aging  is  a  product  of  Korea’s
increasing life expectancy and above all its
low  fertility  rate.   Due  to  significant
improvements in health care and nutrition,
the average life expectancy of Koreans rose
by more than 10 years in the two decades
between 1983 when it was 67.14 to 72.83 in
1993  and  77.46  in  2003.  A  UN  report
projects  South Korea’s  life  expectancy to
increase to 81 years in 2020 and 83.3 years
in 2050 (Korea Times 2005b).  
The most significant reason for this rapid
aging is the falling fertility rate.  Korea’s
total fertility rate was 1.08 in 2005, one of
the lowest, if not the lowest, in the world
(see Figure 1). [4] The decline from 1.47 in
2000 to 1.17 in 2002 is the largest two-year
drop on record, far below the replacement
level  of  2.1  children.  Korea  took  just  16
years for its fertility rate to drop from the
replacement level of 2.1 in 1983 to 1.42 in
1999 compared with Japan (30 years) and
the  Netherlands  (29  years).  If  the  low
birthrate  persists,  as  demographers
anticipate,  the  National  Statistical  Office
projects a total population of 42.35 million
in  2050,  falling  from  the  current  48.29
million.  
(/data/Figure 1.jpg)
As a  consequence,  the  proportion of  the
economically active population (15-64 year
olds), which was 61.4 per cent in 2003, will
rise to 62.7 per cent in 2010 and 64.0 per
cent in 2020 before falling to as low as 53.7
per cent by 2050 (Donga ilbo 2005).  This
p o r t e nd s  a  d e c l i n i n g  l a b o r
supply. According to a report by the Korea
Labor  Institute  (2005),  Korea  will  face  a
severe  labor  shortage  beginning  in  2010.
Assuming that  Korea’s  economic  growth
averages 4.5 per cent and that there will be
an annual 1.51 per cent increase in demand
for labor during the next 15 years,  there
will  be a  shortage of  586,000 workers  in
2015 and 1.23 million in 2020. A Bank of
Korea estimate is even higher, projecting a
shortage of  up to 4.8  million workers in
2020 (Bank of Korea 2006).
In addition to acute labor shortage, the low
bi r thra te  poses  many  economic
problems. Whether in the context of  real
estate  or  consumer  spending,  economic
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growth and population have always been
closely linked. In fact, Korea’s remarkable
economic  development  of  the  last  forty
years was in part fueled by a large young
cohort who provided a sizeable labor pool
(Lee, H. 1999, pp. 82-85).  Other problems
associated with low birthrate are declining
tax revenues for (IMF estimates for every
one  per  cent  increase  in  the  elderly
popu l a t i on ,  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  . 4 6%
deterioration  in  fiscal  balance),  declining
savings  rate,  diminishing  consumption,
waning  investment,  and  budget  deficits
(government expenditure on the elderly in
Korea is expected to soar from 2 per cent of
GDP in 2002 to 8.5 per cent in 2050). Also,
pension funds can dry up and funding for
health insurance can become insufficient.
This leaves Korea with little choice but to
import  increasing  numbers  of  foreign
laborers. The Korean government may be
forced to grant permanent resident status
to  migrant  workers  in  order  to  secure  a
stable supply of labor. The availability of a
large pool of  migrants,  coupled with the
government’s  wish  to  mobilize  foreign
labor, will facilitate a flow of migrants into
Korea. 
The expected increase in labor importation
is  not  a  welcome  prospect  for  the
government, which remains fixated on the
ideology  of  an  ethnically  homogenous
nation.  Consequently,  there  have  been
active  debates  about  extending  the
retirement  age  of  workers,  although  the
current  global  financial  crisis  and  the
concomitant rise in the unemployment of
college graduates is putting a damper on
the  issue.  The  government  has  also
implemented various policies to facilitate a
higher fertility  rate.  These include:  1)  an
allowance  to  every  pregnant  mother  for
medical check-ups; 2) free vaccinations to
all newborns and free medical and dental
check-ups until the age of six; 3) childcare
allowances  for  low-income  families;  4)
expansion of public childcare facilities; 5)
for low-income families, waiving monthly
health  insurance  fees  for  newborns  until
the age of five; 6) subsidies for after-school
programs for the children of  low-income
families; and 6) incentives for companies to
extend,  and  offer  more  benefits  for,
maternity leave.  Public advertisements on
television  and  in  newspapers  promote
having  a  larger  number  of  children  for
each family.
Many local governments have introduced
incentives to encourage more births. Some
provide  childbirth  allowances,  such  as  a
one-time  payment  of  between  one  and
three million won for every second or third
newborn, while some municipalities offer
gift certificates for families to buy clothes,
diapers,  baby  food  and  other  childcare
supplies  for  newborns.  Some  local
governments  provide  state-hired
babysitters  for  up to  30 days to  families
giving birth to a third child. The babysitter
service  is  also  provided  to  low-income
families  for  children aged between three
months  to  12  years.  To  date,  however,
these measures have failed to slow Korea’s
declining fertility rate.
Immigrant  Brides:  Bride  Shortage  and
Increasing  Intermarriage
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In  addition  to  the  continuing  influx  of
foreign laborers, there is yet another factor
conducive  to  the  emergence  o f  a
multicultural Korea:  the influx of foreign
brides. As with migrant laborers, the vast
majority of foreign brides have come from
Asian developing countries .
The proportion of  intermarriages in total
marriages in Korea has jumped more than
ten-fold since 1990, accounting for nearly
14 per cent in 2005. This coincided with the
growing  number  of  migrant  workers  in
Korea (see Table 2). The soaring number of
international  marriages  is  also  due  to  a
significant  growth  in  the  number  of
“picture  brides”  from  abroad.  
Korean men marry Vietnamese women in
Vietnam
Rapid urbanization has largely drained the
countryside of young women in search of
b e t t e r  e d u c a t i o n a l  a n d  j o b
oppor tuni t i e s .  Many  men  in  the
countryside,  on  the  other  hand,  stayed
behind to carry on family farming. These
men have had great  difficulty in finding
marriageable partners who were willing to
give up the comfort of urban life to marry
farmers or fishermen. Unable to find brides
in  Korea,  many  looked  outside  the
country. In 2005, 35.9 per cent of rural men
who married wed foreign brides from such
countries  as  China  (ethnic  Koreans),
Vietnam,  the  Philippines,  and  even
Uzbekistan.[5]  As  Table  3  shows,  most
foreign brides are Asians with more than
three-fourths  coming  from  China  and
Vietnam  in  recent  years,  attesting  to
increases  in  cross-border  hypergamy.
(/data/Table%202.jpg)
(/data/Table%203.jpg)
The  number  of  foreign  brides  will  rise
significantly  over  the  next  decade,  with
Korean son preference, which has led to a
serious imbalance in favor of males since
the  late  1980s,  resulting  in  an  acute
shortage  of  brides.  Table  4  reveals  the
seriousness of sex imbalance in Korea:
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The data are even more startling for the
birth-order-specific sex ratios: the sex ratio
at birth for the family’s third- and fourth-
born  children  has  hovered  between  130
and  140  in  Korea  (see  Park  and  Cho
1995). It  goes without saying that such a
skewed sex ratio at birth has been obtained
through  sex-selective  abortions.  The
proportion of married women aged 20-44
years  old  who  have  had  at  least  one
induced  abortion  has  been  high:  39  per
cent in 1976; 48 per cent in 1979; 52 per cent
in 1988; 49 per cent in 1994; 44 per cent in
1997;  and  40  per  cent  in  2003  (Korea
Institute  for  Health  and  Social  Affairs
1976-2003). 
The normal sex ratio at birth is around 105,
with  extra  males  accruing  rapidly,
especially  between  1988  and  1996.  As  a
consequence,  Korea  is  facing  a  serious
shortage  of  brides.  For  example,  the  sex
ratio  of  men  and  women  in  their  most
“suitable”  years  for  marriage—i.e.,  26-30
year  old  males  and  24-28  year  old
females—is expected to be 118.9 in 2010,
112.0  in  2020  and 116  in  2030  (National
Statistical  Office  2001).  This  means  that
hundreds of  thousands of  males  in their
teens and early 20s will be unable to find
Korean wives.
The  projected  rise  in  intermarriage  in
Korea in the near future suggests that the
nature of intermarriage will change. While
intermarriage  to  date  has  been  largely
limited to farmers and blue-collar workers,
it is likely to increasingly involve urbanites
and  even  college-educated  white-collar
workers.  What is  certain,  consistent  with
international  marriage  trends,  is  that
Korean  men  with  low  incomes  are  less
likely to find Korean wives. 
Korea is not alone when it comes to bride
shortages.  Other  Asian  countries  with
strong son preference,  particularly  China
and  India,  also  face  serious  bride
shortages. For example, China’s sex ratio at
birth  in  2005  was  118  and  there  are  an
estimated 30 million extra men in China.
The number of extra males in India may be
within the  same range (see  Hudson and
Den Boer 2005). As of 2002, other countries
with high sex ratios at birth were Guam
with  114,  Taiwan  110,  China  109,  and
Singapore  108.  What  this  portends  is
increasing  competition  to  lure  brides  in
countries  suffering  from bride  shortages,
particularly  China,  India,  Korea,  and
Taiwan.
The Korean government has discouraged
abortions  in  general  and  sex-selective
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abortions in particular. In fact, abortion has
been illegal  in  Korea,  except  in  cases  of
pregnancies resulting from rape or incest,
involving  deformities  of  fetuses,  and
endangering  the  lives  of  pregnant
women. And doctors are prohibited from
informing the mothers about the sex of the
fetus.  The  harshest  penalty  for  violating
this law for doctors is loss of their license
to practice,  but  no doctor  has  ever  been
“convicted” to that degree of penalty. Thus
far no country has successfully prevented
sex-select abortions.
The issue of  bride migration in Korea is
further  complicated  by  the  growing
number  of  bi-ethnic/bi-racial  children
from “international  marriages.”   Among
the offspring of inter-racial and inter-ethnic
unions, the most numerous are offspring of
Korean individuals  and persons of  other
Asian  heritage.  They  are  called  Kosians,
with  the  prefix  “Ko”  deriving  from  the
term “Korean” and the suffix “sians” from
the  term  “Asians.”  Estimates  vary,  but
their  number reportedly stood at  around
50,000 as of the end of 2006. Nearly a third
of all children born in 2020 are expected to
be Kosians and their accumulated total will
soar to 1.67 million or 3.3 per cent of the
population by that year (JoongAng Daily
2006).   In  addition,  the  number  of  bi-
ethnic/bi-racial children in elementary and
secondary school  reached 13,445 in 2007,
up 68.1  per  cent  from the previous year
(7,998).  The  proportion  of  bi-ethnic/bi-
racial  children  in  total  enrollment  is
expected to rise to 16 per cent in 2118 and
to  more  than  870,000  or  26  per  cent  in
2050.  Elementary  textbooks  will  soon
include  a  section  on  bi-ethnic/bi-racial
children  and  multicultural  families,
highlighting the need to understand their
cultural backgrounds and to develop more
tolerant  attitudes toward them. This  is  a
major change from the emphasis on ethnic
homogeneity, which presented Korea as a
consanguineous  community  comprised
of  the  descendants  of  one  common
ancestor.  Major  television networks  have
started  to  program  shows  featuring
immigrant  brides  and  multicultural
families.  Evidently,  Korean  society  is
starting to implement measures to accept
the multicultural reality, at least for those
who share “Korean blood.”
Bi-ethnic and bi-racial children in Seoul
Mult icul tura l  Korea :  I ssues  and
Implications
This  article  sheds  l ight  on  several
important  i s sues  in  the  s tudy  of
international migration, and reveals many
implications for broader theoretical debate
in  the  field.  First,  in  congruence  with
neoclassical economics, those who come to
Korea  as  unskilled  migrant  workers  are
 APJ | JF 7 | 6 | 2
12
from developing  countries,  prompted by
differentials  in  wages  and  employment
conditions.  Push-pull  factors  also  play  a
role in prompting international migration,
including  by  foreign  brides.  Consonant
with  world  systems theory,  international
migration  to  Korea  can  be  seen  as  an
impact of economic globalization in which
an ever-increasing number  of  people  are
incorporated  into  the  world  economy,
ultimately  engendering  migration  flows.
 The historical-structural approach is also
applicable,  since  Korea,  having  achieved
remarkable economic development in the
last  four  decades,  is  utilizing  labor
importation/migration  to  mobilize  labor.
 In  addition,  hypergamy,  i.e.,  marrying
someone  of  higher  status,  is  evident  for
most  of  the  foreign  brides  who  marry
Korean  men,  the  vast  majority  coming
from relatively poorer countries in Asia.  
The Korean case points to a new trend: the
regional izat ion  of  internat ional
migration.  The influx of  foreign workers
and  brides  illustrates  the  growing
predominance of intra-Asian migration as
opposed to the early postwar decades in
which the primary Korean migrant flows
were  to  North  America.  The  region’s
persisting  economic  disparities  and
demographic  differentials—i.e.,  the
declining labor supply due to rapid aging
in the more developed economies, and the
large  pool  of  the  economically  active
popu l a t i o n  i n  l e s s  d e v e l o p ed
countries—suggest  that  international
migration  will  continue  .  What  will  be
different  is  that  the  destination  will
increasingly be within the Asian region. As
Asia further transforms itself as a region of
growth  and  prosperity,  intra-regional
immigration  is  likely  to  increase  even
more,  given  geographical  proximity  and
cultural similarities between the migrant-
send ing  and  migran t - rece iv ing
countries.  The  increasing  economic  and
cultural integration of the Asian region will
facilitate this trend.
Conclusions
This paper has examined factors that are
making Korea a multiethnic society, as the
inflow of migrant workers addresses labor
shortage  resulting  from rapid  aging  and
low  f e r t i l i t y .  The  r ap id  r i s e  i n
intermarriage,  initially  limited to farmers
and  blue-collar  workers,  will  proliferate
into  wider  social  classes  as  the  decades-
long practice of son-preference results in a
shortage  of  females.  As  a  consequence,
interracial and interethnic births are on the
rise. Taiwan, which seems to be ahead of
Korea by about ten years in experiencing
labor  importation and bride  importation,
provides a glimpse into changes that are in
store for Korea in the near future:  cross-
border  marriages  accounted  for  20.1  per
cent of total marriages in Taiwan in 2005
(the figure reached its peak in 2003 when it
was 31.9 per cent), while births of bi-ethnic
and bi-racial  children  accounted for  12.9
per cent of total births (Kojima 2006).
These patterns generally correspond to the
five  general  trends  in  international
migration identified by Castles and Miller
(2003,  pp.  7-9):  1)  the  globalization  of
migration—more countries are affected by
migration and migrants come from more
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diverse  areas;  2)  the  acceleration  of
migration—international  migration  of
people is growing across the globe; 3) the
differentiation  of  migration—most
countries  have  a  range  of  types  of
immigration,  including  labor  migration,
refugees and permanent settlement; 4) the
feminization  of  migration—women  are
playing  a  greater  role  in  most  types  of
migration,  in  both  labor  and  marriage
migra t i on . ;  and  5 )  t he  g rowing
politicization  of  migration—international
migration  is  having  a  greater  impact  on
domestic  politics  and  national  security
policies  of  states  as  well  as  bilateral
relationships  among  them.  The  growing
multiethnic character of Korea is consistent
with broad trends of migration; the growth
in  the  number  of  migrant  workers  and
foreign  brides  in  Korea  indicates  the
acceleration  of  migration;  the  influx  of
foreigners into Korea began with migrant
workers, but expanded to include foreign
brides,  illustrating  the  differentiation  of
migration;  in  addition  to  the  sizable
number  of  female  migrant  workers,  the
growing  number  of  foreign  brides  is
emblematic  of  the  feminization  of
migration;  and  the  Korean  government’s
monitoring  of  labor-and  bride-sending
countries  is  indicative  of  the  growing
politicization  of  migration.
Despite all the indications that the country
is rapidly becoming a multicultural society,
the  Korean  government  still  insists  on
almost  zero-immigration.  In  contrast  to
such  “immigration  countries”  as  the
United States, Canada, and Australia that
have  extended  citizenship  to  many  new
residents and encouraged their integration
and assimilation,  Korea  remains  a  “non-
immigration”  country,  much  like  Japan
and many Western European countries, its
policy objectives  centering on controlling
inflows,  restricting  long-term  stays,
discouraging  permanent  residence  and
limiting  citizenship.
The current Lee Myung-bak government is
continuing  to  promote  the  previous
administration’s  goal  of  changing  policy
toward  foreigners  from  “control  and
management”  to  “understanding  and
respect.” But if  changes in law are to be
e f f e c t i ve ,  t he r e  w i l l  have  t o  be
accompanying changes in the mindset and
attitude  of  Koreans  to  embrace  the
multiethnic society that is emerging.
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Notes:
[1]  Flows  of  immigration  from Korea  to
Japan have been minimal in the post-WWII
period.   A part of the reason for this is that
Japan  grants  citizenship  based  on  jus
sanguinis or the law of blood, meaning that
it  ascribes  citizenship  by  blood,  not  by
place of birth (jus soli).  This has made it
difficult  for  Koreans in  Japan to  become
f u l l - f l e d g ed  c i t i z e n s  a nd  t h e
discriminations against  them has become
popularly known in Korea. 
[2] The focus of this article is on temporary
migrant  workers  in  post-war  Korea.  The
earliest labor migration in modern Korean
history actually took place at the turn of
the twentieth century.  Between 1903 and
1905, more than 7,000 Koreans migrated to
Hawaii  to  work  as  laborers  for  sugar
plantations. The contact between Koreans
and recruiters for Hawaiian sugar planters
was  largely  provided  by  American
missionaries  stationed  in  Korea  at  the
time. These migrant workers came from a
wide range of social classes. Later, during
the  Japanese  colonial  period  (1910-1945),
hundreds  of  thousands  of  Korean
“migrant” workers were sent overseas by
Japanese authorities to work in mines and
factories  and  many  others  migrated  to
Manchukuo.
[3] It must be noted that even before the
government formally began implementing
labor-importing  policies,  a  considerable
number of transnational migrant workers
were in Korea. This was a result of the fact
that  the  Korean  government  eased
conditions for tourist visas in preparations
for the Asian Games in 1986 and the Seoul
Olympics in 1988.
[4] The reasons for the low fertility rate in
Korea include the following: 1) people are
marrying  at  older  ages  due  to  longer
schooling and working; 2) more people are
staying unmarried; 3) the stress of raising
children,  particularly  due  to  education
frenzy;  4)  high  living  costs;  5)  high
education costs (Korea’s per capita private
spending  on  education  is  the  second
highest  in  the  world  after  the  United
States);  and  6)  high  childcare  costs.  A
noteworthy  fact  about  the  relationship
between  the  low  fertility  rate  and  high
living  costs  is  that  Korean  women  with
higher  levels  of  educational  attainment,
hence higher socio-economic class, actually
have higher fertility rates (around 1.5 for
women  with  college  education  and  less
than  1  for  those  with  e lementary
education). This is at odds with a universal
trend  which  shows  that  educational
attainment  is  negatively  correlated  with
fertility rate, meaning that the higher the
educational  attainment,  the  lower  the
fertility  rate.
[5] Both of the patterns, i.e., migration of
mainly  unskilled  Asian  laborers  and
foreign brides, took place earlier in Japan.
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